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Abstract 
 
We compare the distributional consequences of two different waiting times initiatives. The primary 
focus of Scotland’s recent waiting time reforms has been on reducing maximum waiting times 
through the imposition of high profile national targets. In Norway, the focus has been on 
appropriate prioritisation of referrals to hospital based on disease severity, the expected benefit of 
the treatment and cost-effectiveness. We use large, national administrative datasets from before and 
after each of these reforms and assign priority groups based on the maximum waiting times 
stipulated in Norwegian medical guidelines. To equalise case-mix over time, we use Exact 
Matching to weight the pre-reform patients to the patient composition in the post-reform period. We 
regress patient-level waiting times on patient characteristics and on a post-reform indicator 
interacted with the patient’s priority group. The analysis shows that the least-prioritised patients 
benefited most from both reforms. This was at the cost of longer waiting times for patients that 
should have been given higher priority in Norway, while Scotland’s high priority patients remained 
unaffected. This comparative analysis indicates that blanket waiting times initiatives may be more 
effective in reducing waiting times while preserving prioritisation between patients with different 
health needs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Waiting times and waiting lists are a significant concern in countries where the majority of health 
care services are provided within the public sector. The main reasons are that access to health care 
services is financed through taxes, copayments are low and all inhabitants have the right to 
treatment. This leads to rationing of patients by waiting lists.  
 
In recent years there has been a trend for policy makers to set priorities on a more explicit basis. 
The most common policy is blanket waiting-time target setting (introduced in Australia, Denmark, 
England, Italy, Scotland, Spain, and Sweden). Under blanket waiting time targets, all patients have 
equal priority regardless of their clinical condition and the treatment they are waiting to receive. 
This unconditional guarantee may be effective in reducing long waiting times (Siciliani and Hurst, 
2005), but the reduction of waiting times does not necessarily benefit all the patients because 
hospitals may choose to treat less needy patients. Other countries have introduced vertical waiting 
time prioritisation. With this type of prioritisation explicit guidelines are given on how patients 
should be prioritised. In New Zealand, patients receive points, and patients with more points have 
shorter waiting times (Edwards 1999). In Norway, three criteria - disease severity, the expected 
benefit of the treatment and cost-effectiveness of treatment - determine an individually set 
maximum waiting time. It is believed that vertical waiting time targets will lead to a higher 
prioritisation and reduced waiting time primarily for patients in most need of treatment.  
 
Much attention has been paid to how prioritisation should be organised, at which levels decisions 
should be taken and how the resources should be distributed (Klein, 1993). From an ethical and 
public health viewpoint, some studies investigate normative approaches to prioritisation, see for 
example Daniels (2000) and Cappelen and Norheim (2006). From a theoretical point of view   4
waiting lists may be seen as suboptimal as waiting times are costly to patients and entail few 
benefits for the providers. However, with asymmetric information between payer and provider 
about the value of treatments, a public sector insurer may decide to ration resources allocated to 
hospitals so patients with low valuation exit the waiting list due to time costs. Two recent papers, 
Gravelle and Siciliani (2008a; 2008b) analyse how waiting times should be allocated among 
patients, given a rationing regime. In the first paper they show that it is welfare improving to 
prioritise on observable characteristics. Specifically, prioritisation of patient groups should be 
governed by how sensitive patients are to the length of waiting time, and their costs of waiting. 
Gravelle and Siciliani (2008b) investigate how a fixed health care budget should be allocated across 
treatments when patient charges are fixed and care is rationed by waiting within treatments. In this 
case the optimal allocation of resources across treatments should result in longer waiting times for 
treatments where demand is more elastic with respect to waiting times.  
 
The empirical literature of prioritisation practices is limited, and differs in the kind of data that are 
used. Arnesen et al (2002) and Löfvendahl et al (2005) investigate patients’ medical records. A 
problem with this approach is the limited sample that can be used, and the potentially very high cost 
of providing data of sufficient generality. As an alternative, Askildsen et al (2010a), Dimakou et al 
(2009) and Propper et al (2010) use register based data. Askildsen et al (2010a) evaluated whether 
prioritisation-practices changed following a Norwegian hospital reform, which changed ownership 
structures and catchment areas of the hospitals. Dimakou et al (2009) analyse how the probability of 
admission of any given patient varies during the time they wait. They find that hazard rates vary 
over time and that a high probability of admission coincides with targets, which changes when 
targets change. Propper et al (2010) analyse whether a planned reduction in waiting times, backed 
up by strong managerial sanctions and stringent monitoring, reduced waiting times. By comparing 
changes over time in England to those in Scotland (which adopted a similar policy later), they found   5
that the policy met the goal to reduce long waiting times without apparently diverting effort from 
less well-monitored aspects of health care. Their analysis of re-prioritisation, however, was 
inconclusive as the pre-intervention trends differed between the two countries. 
 
In this paper we compare the consequences of two different prioritisation policies, blanket and 
vertical prioritisation, for inpatient treatments. For that purpose we use data from Norway and 
Scotland as different prioritisation policies have been introduced in the two countries over the same 
period. Specifically we analyse i) if the common concern of too low priority given to the most 
severely ill patients occurs when blanket waiting time targets are introduced, and ii) if more severe 
patients are prioritised better in a country where vertical prioritisation is introduced.  
 
To evaluate the effects on prioritisation of the two different reforms, we use exact matching as a 
way to pre-process the data. This way the treatment group (post-reform patients) and control group 
(pre-reform patients) have the same background characteristics. Specifically we match on patient 
characteristics, diagnosis and the quarter of the year when treatment was provided. We then regress 
the patient-level waiting times on patient characteristics and the priority groups. We use the method 
developed by Askildsen et al (2010b) to assign patients to priority groups based on Norwegian 
medical guidelines. Since our main interest is if the prioritisation pattern has changed, we include a 
post-reform indicator interacted with the priority groups.  
 
The results are somewhat surprising. The analysis shows that the patients with the lowest priority 
benefited most from the reforms in both countries. In Norway, where we should expect the vertical 
prioritisation to benefit the higher priority patients, the derived effect actually appears to have been 
at the expense of this group. In Scotland, however, waiting times for the high priority patients were 
unaffected.    6
 
The paper is organised as follows. The institutional settings in Norway and Scotland are contained 
in section 2. In section 3 we present the empirical method. The data and descriptive statistics are 
presented in section 4 while the estimation results are presented in section 5. Section 6 contains the 
discussion and the concluding remarks.  
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
 
2.1. Norway  
The Norwegian specialised health care sector is predominantly publicly owned and, as of 2002, 
organised as state owned enterprises within five
1 (north, mid, west, south, east) regional health 
authorities. The regional health authorities have the responsibility for providing specialist health 
care to all patients within the region.
2 Provision of this health care is organised through health 
enterprises owned and governed by the regional enterprises. The regional health authorities can also 
contract with private suppliers for providing treatment. However, this outsourcing is quite small 
compared to overall treatment activity, and confined to a few diagnoses. Patients’ access to 
specialised health care is either through a referral system (elective care) or by emergency care. 
 
Regional Health Authorities are financed by a mixture of block grants, based on capitation or risk 
adjustment formula, and a DRG activity based system (implemented in the Norwegian hospital 
sector from 1 July 1997). Another important feature is the patients’ right to free choice of hospital, 
which came into effect at a national level in 2001. However, relatively few patients seem to have 
                                                 
1 Four from June 2007 when south and east were merged. 
2 See Hagen and Kaarboe (2006) and Magnussen et al (2007) for descriptions of the Norwegian hospital sector and the 
2002-reform where hospital ownership was transferred from the county councils to the central government.    7
opted for the possibility of receiving treatment outside of natural hospital catchment areas 
(Vrangbæk et al, 2007). 
 
An important principle within the Norwegian health care system is the right to access and to equal 
treatment for all inhabitants, irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and place 
of residence. This principle is regulated through the Act on Patients Rights and administrative 
regulation of prioritisation (Ministry of Health and Social Services, 1999; 2003). For elective 
patients, it establishes that, upon referral, the assessment of a patient’s condition must consider: a) 
how serious is the condition, b) whether a suitable treatment exists that may improve the patient’s 
condition, and c) the cost-effectiveness of this treatment. From September 2004 patients who are 
referred to the specialist health care sector have the right, within 30 days from referral, to an 
evaluation of whether or not their medical condition is such that it gives a right to treatment within 
an individual maximum waiting time.  
 
According to the regulations all patients should be categorised into one of the following categories: 
1.  Urgent care 
2.  Elective treatment, with individual maximum waiting time  
3.  Elective treatment, without individual waiting time 
4.  Other health care services that may be demanded.  
 
Patients in categories 1 and 2 comprise the core health care supply of Norwegian public hospitals. 
However, patients in category 3 also have the right to treatment. It is only demand from patients in 
category 4 that are excluded from the mandatory activities of the public health enterprises. 
   8
The allocation of prioritisation status to elective patients is formally managed in the following way. 
Upon receipt of a referral, within 30 days the hospital has to consider whether the patient belongs to 
category 2 or 3, or whether (s)he should not receive treatment at all. This decision is based only on 
the description of the medical condition given by the primary care physician. Each patient is to be 
considered according to the priority regulations, criteria a-c above. If the patient is considered as 
belonging to category 2, (s)he is given an individual maximum waiting time until start of treatment. 
If this waiting time is exceeded, the patient has the right to file a complaint. The hospital is then 
given a short time frame for providing treatment (typically 14 days). If treatment is still not given, 
the patient can choose treatment at another hospital, privately, publicly or abroad, at the cost of the 
initial health enterprise. The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (NAV) has organised a special 
unit to help patients choose their provider and ensure that the new provider gets paid. 
 
2.2. Scotland 
The Scottish specialised health care sector is also predominantly publicly owned. It is organised 
into 14 regional health boards
3, responsible for primary, community and secondary (hospital) health 
care services to the populations resident within their geographical boundaries. These boards receive 
an annual budget from the Scottish Government, based on a weighted capitation formula. Until 
2004, responsibility for providing hospital services was held by NHS Acute Trusts who negotiated 
annual contracts with local health boards. From 2004, health boards took over direct responsibility 
for delivering these services. Activity-based financing has never operated for hospital services in 
Scotland. Contracts with private suppliers represent a very small proportion of NHS-financed 
hospital care and privately-financed (either directly or through insurance) hospital care is also a 
very small proportion of total hospital care expenditure. 
 
                                                 
3  Previously 15 Health Boards until 2006.   9
Until recently, waiting times in Scotland were measured in parts of the patient journey. There was 
separate measurement of (a) the wait between GP referral and the first specialist visit and (b) the 
wait between the specialist’s decision to admit a patient and the patient’s receipt of treatment. The 
first aspiration to reduce waiting times by the new devolved administration was announced in 2000 
(Scottish Executive 2000). The maximum waiting time was to be nine months by December 2003. 
A more ambitious target of six months was announced for 2005 in a 2002 press release (Audit 
Scotland, 2006), but it was not until February 2003 that these aspirations became firm policy 
commitments in a health White Paper (Scottish Executive, 2003). Just a year later in 2004, a further 
White Paper pledged to reduce waiting times to 18 weeks by 2007 (Scottish Executive, 2004). 
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHOD 
 
In order to investigate how prioritisation practice has evolved over time, we need a way to assign 
priorities. In this paper we use a method suggested by Askildsen et al (2010b) which derives 
maximum waiting times from Norwegian medical guidelines. These guidelines were developed at 
one of the Norwegian health authorities, Health Region West
4. This region covers about 22 % of the 
population in Norway. The medical guidelines cover 21 medical specialities. Based on a description 
of a medical condition, they assign a recommended maximum waiting time (between 4 and 52 
weeks), or no priority. By translating the medical conditions in the guidelines to ICD10 codes we 
have been able to assign patients in Norwegian and Scottish patient registers to maximum 
acceptable waiting time groups.
5 Patients are mapped into groups with maximum waiting times of 
28 (which we label ‘very high’ priority), 56 (‘high’), 84 (‘medium’) and 182 (‘low’) days. In 
                                                 
4 A potential problem is that medical guidelines developed in one health region might be affected by access to medical 
staff and medical equipment (capacity constraints), and that capacity constraints vary systematically among regions. 
Sveri (2005) finds that capacity constraints were not taken into consideration when the maximum waiting times were 
set.  
5 We are grateful to Jacob Mosvold, chief consultant physician at ’Diakonhjemmet hospital’ (Oslo) for translating 
descriptions of medical conditions into relevant ICD10 codes, and to professor in medicine Ole Frithjof Norheim for 
advising us interpreting the guidelines. See Nordheim (2005) and Askildsen et al (2010b) for further documentation.   10
addition one group of patients are not given a maximum waiting time (‘no’ priority, corresponding 
to category 3). There are also some patients who receive treatments which correspond to ICD-10 
codes not classified by the guidelines. We have grouped these patients into the group, ‘unknown 
priority’.  
 
A reasonable assumption is that if one patient group is given a shorter maximum waiting time 
relative to another patient group, the former group has higher priority. Thus we can compare actual 
waiting times for patients with medical conditions of different severity in different time periods and 
evaluate how the introduction of individual maximum waiting times for elective treatment and 
equal maximum waiting times have influenced prioritisation practice in the two countries. If, for a 
particular group of patients, the actual waiting time decreases (increases) relative to other patients, 
this might be interpreted as if this patient group is being higher (lower) prioritised.  
 
Ideally, to allow for unobservable heterogeneity, we would compare waiting times for the same 
patient with exactly the same severity of medical condition before and after the reform. This is 
rarely possible, of course. Instead, we compare the patients in the two periods - before and after the 
introduction of the latest reforms - in the two countries.  
 
We use exact matching (Ho et al, 2007; Iacus et al, 2009) as a way to pre-process the data set, so 
that the pre- and post-reform groups have the same observable characteristics. We sort all patients 
into strata, each of which has the same values of combinations of the matching variables. Strata that 
do not include at least one pre-reform observation and one post-reform observation are pruned from 
the dataset. The following weights (θ) are then calculated and applied to each of the pre-reform 
observations: 













































θ          ( 1 )  
 
in which Nj is the number of observations in strata j at time t, with t=0 and t=1 indicating the pre-
reform and post-reform periods, respectively. All post-reform observations are assigned a weight of 
one. 
 
We then undertake weighted regression of the patient-level waiting times on patient characteristics, 
the quarter of addition and, since the main interest is if the prioritisation pattern has changed, we 
include a post-reform indicator interacted with the patient’s priority group. We estimate the 
following model:  
 
it g i 3 2 g i 1 0 it ' x P ] 1 t [ D ] 1 t [ D P W ln ε + β + = α + = α + α + α = ∈ ∈      ( 2 )  
 
where  
it W = waiting time for patient i added to the waiting list at time t 
g i P∈ = vector of dummy variables representing the priority group to which patient i is assigned 
D[t=1] = binary indicator for the post-reform period 
x = vector of individual characteristics: gender, age, number of co-morbidities, and the quarter of 
addition to the waiting list. 
 
We use different matching criteria: first, we match only on the patient characteristics and the quarter 
of addition. In the extension of the matching procedure we also include the main full ICD-10 
diagnosis. Our use of exact matching means that we prune observations for which there is no exact   12
match in the pre-reform period. Some observations are pruned from the dataset when we use richer 
matching criteria. 
 
The two countries tackled the excess waiting times in different ways. In Scotland, the patients at 
risk of breaching the targets were diverted to a waiting times centre that the NHS had bought from 
the private sector. Thus, changing the distribution of patients across hospitals was part of Scotland’s 
waiting times reform. Patients in Norway are given right to file a complaint if the maximum waiting 
time targets are exceeded. However, the same hospital is given an opportunity to treat the patient 
before an external hospital was contacted.
6 We present models including hospital fixed effects for 
both countries, but interpret the models without fixed effects in Scotland as the full effect of the 
reform.  
 
Using this detailed matching procedure, we think it is reasonable to conclude that we compare 
similar individuals under different prioritisation regimes. Therefore, if, relative to the change 
observed for other groups of patients, a patient group has shorter waiting times after the reform 
compared to the pre-reform period, we interpret this as this patient group being higher prioritised 
after the reform.  
 
There may be other changes that occurred at the same time as the prioritisation reform, such as 
increases in the amount of resource available, capacity and hospital productivity and we cannot 
distinguish these from the pure reform effect. Still, it is likely that these changes affect all patients 
rather than particular groups of patients selectively affected by the prioritisation reform.   
 
 
                                                 
6 When violations occur, hospitals are given 14 days to treat these patients. The hospital is not penalised if this time 
limit is not violated.    13
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The data in both countries are taken from the administrative patient registers covering the whole 
population of patients referred for elective inpatient hospital treatment in the period 2003 – 2006. 
The main interest in our analysis is the policy change and we therefore restrict the period of the 
analysis to two year periods: patients added to waiting lists between 1
st of August 2003 – 31
st of 
July 2004 are included in the pre-reform year, while patients added between the 1
st of August 2005 
– 31
st of July 2006 constitute the sample for the post-reform period. This allows us to look at the 
patients that should, according to the Scottish policy, be waiting at most nine and six months, 
respectively. We are also able to capture the introduction of the maximum individual waiting time 
in Norway from the 1
st of September 2004. Figure 1 illustrates the policy changes in the two 
countries and the observation periods. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
To avoid serial hospital admissions (e.g. dialysis treatment, radiotherapy and chemotherapy) we 
only include the first hospital stay for each patient in each year. In the analysis, we follow the 
individuals added to the list for up to 17 months. Small proportions of patients waiting longer than 
520 days are excluded from the analysis in order to avoid censoring of the later additions to the list. 
In the Scottish dataset, the proportions waiting longer than 520 days are 0.9% and 0.4% in the pre-
reform and post-reform periods, respectively. The same proportions in the Norwegian dataset are 
4.7% and 1.5%. We have also dropped patients with missing or invalid waiting times and missing 
values on one or more of the explanatory or matching variables. 
   14
In order to have as similar coverage as possible, some observations had to be excluded from the 
Norwegian data as admissions for these conditions are recorded in different registers or in a 
different manner in Scotland. We excluded admissions for psychological diseases,  pregnancy, 
certain conditions originating in the perinatal period and external causes. Descriptive statistics for 
the samples are provided in an Appendix.  
 
4.1 The Norwegian dataset  
The Norwegian data come from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR). The register contains 
detailed information on inpatients, including patient characteristics (such as age and gender), 
waiting time, name and location of the hospital providing the treatment, type of treatment (medical, 
surgical) and diagnoses. Waiting times are measured from General Practitioner referral to admission 
at the hospital.  
 
Table I shows the distribution of waiting times. There are only minor differences in the distributions 
in pre- and post reform periods. The mean waiting time has increased by one day and the waiting 
times below the median have also slightly increased. The median waiting time has increased by 5 
days. At the 90
th percentile the waiting times have decreased by 12 days.  
 
[Table I about here] 
 
In Table II we report mean waiting times for different patient groups in the pre-reform and post-
reform period. The ‘very high’ priority patients have the shortest average waiting time but this 
exceeds the guidelines by more than one month. The priority groups that have experienced a 
reduction in mean waiting time are the patients in the ‘low’ and ‘no priority’ groups. This might be 
an indication that hospitals are more concerned with the long waits rather than the maximum   15
waiting time targets. Unlike Dimakou et al (2007), we do not observe the probability of admission 
rising sharply just before the target. 
 
 [Table II about here] 
 
Male patients wait about two days longer than females both before and after the reform. The 
waiting time decreases monotonically with age (except for children below the age of six). Waiting 
time is also generally decreasing in the number of co-morbidities and varies considerably across 
ICD-10 chapters.  
 
4.2. The Scottish dataset  
In the Scottish analysis, we make use of data from the Scottish Morbidity Record 01 (SMR01). This 
database records detailed information on all admissions to acute hospitals, including patient 
characteristics such as age and gender, waiting time, name and location of the hospital providing the 
treatment, type of treatment (medical, surgical), and diagnoses. In the Scottish dataset, waiting 
times are measured from the point at which the specialist decides that the patient needs an 
admission to the point at which the patient is admitted to hospital. All else equal, the available 
measures of waiting times in Scotland should be shorter than those in Norway. 
 
In Scotland, the mean waiting time has fallen from 84 to 75 days (Table I). Waiting times have 
slightly increased below the median. At the 90
th percentile, the waiting time has fallen by 59 days. 
The distributional consequences are therefore as expected; an increased focus on those with longer 
waiting times is accompanied by longer waiting times for those with shorter waiting times before 
the reform. 
   16
Scottish waiting times are aligned with the priorities assigned by the Norwegian medical guidelines: 
with the exception of the ‘no priority’ group, patients with higher assigned priority wait a shorter 
time (Table II). Almost all groups experienced decreased waiting times but waiting times for the 
most prioritised patients have decreased the least in both relative and absolute terms. Males wait a 
shorter time for treatment than females in Scotland. The waiting time decreases monotonically with 
age for adults, and with the number of co-morbidities. Patients with musculoskeletal and eye 
conditions have experienced the largest reduction in waiting time.  
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
In the multivariate regression analyses reported in this section we compare changes in the 
conditional mean waiting times over time. The coefficient on the reform dummy captures the 
general trend in waiting times applied to all groups. A negative coefficient on the interaction 
variable between a particular priority group and the reform dummy means that waiting times 
reduced more over time for this group than the ‘very high’ priority group (the reference group).  
 
The main results are presented in Table III for Norway and Table IV for Scotland.  
 
[Table III and IV about here] 
 
Model 1 contains only the priority group dummies and these dummies interacted with the post-
reform period indicator. In Models 2-5 we also control for gender, age, number of co-morbidities 
and the quarter of addition.
7 Model 3 shows the results when we use the weights from exact 
matching on combinations of the patient characteristics and the quarter when patients were added to 
                                                 
7 We control for quarters since hospital production varies systematically over the year.     17
the list. Model 4 shows the effect on Model 3 when hospital fixed-effects are added. Each of the 
Models 1-4 are estimated on the full sample as an exact match exists in the pre-reform period for 
each post- reform patient. Model 5 is estimated on a smaller sample once we have additionally 
matched on combinations of the previous matching variables and the full ICD-10 diagnosis. Where 
there is no patient in the pre-reform period that has the same patient characteristics and the same 
quarter of addition and the same full ICD-10 diagnosis as a patient in the post-reform period, these 
patients are excluded.  
 
The Model 1 results for Norway (Table III) confirm that all priority groups had significantly longer 
logged waiting times compared to the ‘very high’ priority patients (the reference category) before 
the reform. This remains the case in all of the models. The coefficient on the post-reform period 
dummy is positive, suggesting that the mean logged waiting time for the ‘very high’ priority patient 
increased by 6-8 %. This change broadly applies across the high, medium and missing priority 
groups, since the interaction terms for these groups are generally insignificant. However, the 
interaction terms for the low and no priority groups are negative and of a similar magnitude to the 
main effect for the post-reform period. Thus, the low and no priority groups experienced no 
increase in waiting time. Indeed, when we also match on the full diagnosis in Model 5, the 
coefficients are slightly bigger, indicating that waiting times decreased more for the patients in the 
low priority group. However, the sample size in Model 5 is also reduced as a more detailed 
matching procedure is applied. As explained earlier, for Norway, we believe that models 4 and 5 are 
preferred as the hospital fixed effects are controlled for. The coefficients on other explanatory 
variables (not shown) suggest that these have a significant effect on waiting time. Men wait 
approximately 7% longer than women. Older patients wait significantly shorter than the youngest 
age group. Patients with more co-morbidities wait significantly shorter than those with no   18
comorbidities. These latter results might relate to more severely ill patients and might therefore be 
in accordance with the prioritisation guidelines.    
 
The same models are estimated for Scotland. However, as a change in the distribution of patients 
across hospitals was part of the Scottish waiting time reform, the hospital FE are not included in 
Model 5. The Model 1 results for Scotland (Table IV) confirm that all groups wait longer for the 
treatment than the very high priority group before the reform, even if no explicit guidelines on 
vertical prioritisation are stated in Scotland. Indeed the magnitudes of the differences between the 
groups are substantially larger than in Norway. The coefficient on the post-reform indicator is 
generally small and insignificant, suggesting no change in waiting time for the very high priority 
group. This indicates that Scotland may have enjoyed more of a reduction in average waiting times 
if its case-mix had not shifted towards patients that tend to wait longer. 
 
As in Norway, the changes over time for the high and medium priority groups are not statistically 
significantly different from the changes for the very high priority group. Also as in Norway, the low 
and no priority groups have however experienced a significantly different change over time. In 
Scotland, these groups have experienced a 10-15% reduction in mean waiting time relative to the 
very high priority group, which did not change over time. In Norway, the lowest prioritised groups 
have experienced a 7-12% reduction in mean waiting time relative to the very high priority group, 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have evaluated the effects of two different prioritisation policies, namely blanket 
and vertical prioritisation. Norway and Scotland were used as special cases to investigate the 
consequences of these policies. In Scotland, blanket waiting-time prioritisation was introduced, 
where all patients have equal priority / equal maximum waiting time guarantee regardless of their 
clinical condition and the treatment they are waiting to receive. Vertical prioritisation, i.e. 
prioritisation within patient groups with corresponding individual maximum waiting time targets, 
was introduced in Norway.   
 
According to the Norwegian guidelines, patients are allocated into groups based on disease severity, 
the expected benefits of treatments, and cost-effectiveness considerations. Correct prioritisation 
implies that more seriously ill patients, with higher expected benefits, and where a cost-effective 
treatment exists, should be treated first. If prioritisation is correct, we would expect patients with 
shorter maximum waiting times and more co-morbidities to experience lower waiting times after 
the policy change in Norway compared to similar patients prior to the reform. The regression results 
show that all priority groups waited for treatment longer than the most prioritised group before the 
reform. However, after the Norwegian reform, the waiting times for the higher priority patients did 
not change, while they reduced for the lower priority patients. There appears therefore to have been 
a switch in priority away from the highest priority patients.  
 
The unconditional maximum waiting time targets introduced in Scotland do not take into account 
the severity of the patient’s condition. Therefore, one of the concerns has been whether the reduced 
mean waiting times may lead to diversion of effort towards the least needy patients. Our results 
show that this is not the case in Scotland: the more aggressive maximum waiting time targets   20
contributed to shorter waiting times for low priority patients while leaving the high priority patients 
unaffected.  
 
All in all, our analysis indicates that the individual maximum waiting times introduced in Norway 
did not succeed in reducing the waiting times for the highly prioritised patients. The reform required 
referrals to exhibit quite detailed information about the patient for the hospital specialist to correctly 
assess their prioritisation. We might thus expect that it will take some time before new prioritisation 
routines are established. In contrast, the stricter blanket prioritisation policy in Scotland, 
accompanied by increases in resources, did succeed in reducing the waiting times for those patients 
who previously waited longest without affecting the speed with which the most prioritised patients 
were treated. We therefore conclude that blanket waiting times targets do not necessarily lead to 
distortion of clinical priorities and that prioritisation based on clinical guidelines does not 
necessarily lead to better clinical prioritisation in the short term.  
   21
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Table I: Changes in the distribution of waiting times (days) 
Period Percentiles  Mean  N 
    10th 25th 50th 75th 90th     
N o r w a y          
Pre-reform 8  20  50  129  278 97.5  112,215 
Post-reform 9  22  55  132  266  98.6  132,919 
Scotland         
Pre-reform 5  13  44  129  231 84.1  144,190 
Post-reform 5  15  49  119  172  74.9  145,082 
 
Notes: Time waited between GP referral and admission in Norway. Time waited between specialist decision to admit 
and admission in Scotland. Pre-reform period is 1
st August 2003 – 31
st July 2004. Post-reform period is 1
st August 2005 
– 31
st July 2006 in both countries. 
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Table II Mean waiting times (days) by patient category 
  Norway Scotland 
 
  Pre-reform Post-reform Change Pre-reform Post-reform Change 
Priority group (maximum wait)             
Very high (28 days)  62.3  65.3  3.0  33.8  31.1  -2.7 
High (56 days)  71.7  73.5  1.8  36.2  32.3  -4.0 
Medium (84 days)  86.1  91.6  5.5  79.4  68.4  -11.0 
Low (182 days)  115.2  112.3  -3.0  141.1  116.0  -25.2 
No priority (unlimited)  110.9  108.8  -2.1  107.2  90.1  -17.1 
Missing priority  101.9  103.7  1.9  71.0  66.0  -5.0 
Gender           
Female  96.6 97.6  1.0  85.4 76.4  -9.0 
Male 98.5  99.5  1.1  82.5  73.1  -9.3 
Age category             
Age 0 – 6  110.0  112.0  2.0  72.6  68.3  -4.4 
Age 7 – 17  123.2  120.9  -2.3  86.5  74.1  -12.5 
Age 18 – 39  111.4  114.0  2.7  94.9  85.7  -9.2 
Age 40 – 54  103.0  107.3  4.3  88.7  80.3  -8.3 
Age 55 – 64  96.6  98.4  1.8  84.4  76.1  -8.3 
Age 65 – 74  88.2  89.2  1.0  83.2  71.3  -11.9 
Age 75 – 84  80.1  79.5  -0.6 74.1  65.2  -9.0 
Age 85+  66.7  65.1  -1.6 59.9  54.1  -5.8 
Number of comorbidities             
None 103.9  104.9  0.9  91.2  80.7  -10.5 
1 98.2  99.5  1.3  81.7  73.7  -8.0 
2 88.9  92.9  4.0  77.2  70.8  -6.4 
3 86.6  86.3  -0.3  72.2 65.0  -7.2 
4 82.5  88.7  6.3  67.7  61.8  -5.9 
5 or more  76.9  78.5  1.6  61.6  52.4  -9.2 
ICD-10 chapter             
Infections (A00-B99)  77.1  82.6  5.6  41.7  36.2  -5.5 
Neoplasms (C00-D48)  56.4  57.7  1.3  29.4  28.4  -1.0 
Blood (D50-D89)  61.5  57.5  -4.0  29.2  30.1  0.8 
Endocrine (E00-E90)  112.1  134.8  22.7  64.6  64.5  -0.1 
Nervous (G00-G99)  115.4  124.9  9.5  51.9  66.7  14.8 
Eye (H00-H59)  111.5  92.7  -18.8  110.6  84.3  -26.4 
Ear (H60-H95)  182.2  188.5  6.3  104.5  103.0  -1.5 
Circulatory (I00-I99)  80.7  80.2  -0.5  75.6  61.1  -14.4 
Respiratory (J00-J99)  111.5  119.5  8.0  102.7  93.6  -9.1 
Digestive (K00-K93)  87.6  83.8 -3.9 83.8 75.4  -8.5 
Skin (L00-L99)  112.9  105.7  -7.2  73.3  68.0  -5.3 
Musculoskeletal (M00-M99)  122.2  117.1  -5.1  154.1  124.0  -30.0 
Genitourinary (N00-N99)  101.3  99.31  -2.0  87.6  79.4  -8.2 
Congenital (Q00-Q99)  149.1  147.9  -1.2  108.3  95.4  -12.9 
Symptoms & signs (R00-R99)  94.3  100.9  6.6  48.9  47.2  -1.7 
Injuries & poisoning (S00-T98)  117.5  117.9  0.4  59.2  54.5  -4.8 
Influencing factors (Z00-Z99)  115.6  118.6  3.0  90.2  80.9  -9.4 
Health region             
Health region East  89.9  90.9  1.0  89.9  81.7  -8.2 
Health region South  98.3  85.1  -13.2  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Health region West  102.7  96.8  -5.9  79.8  69.0  -10.7 
Health region Mid  97.6  102.5  4.9  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Health region North  110.6  97.1  -13.5  85.2  78.1  -7.1 
Notes: Time waited between GP referral and admission in Norway. Time waited between specialist decision to admit 
and admission in Scotland. Pre-reform period is 1
st August 2003 – 31
st July 2004. Post-reform period is 1
st August 2005 
– 31
st July 2006 in both countries.   26
Table III Regression results: Norway 
Priority group  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
High  0.279** 0.305** 0.314** 0.296** 0.423** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) 
Medium  0.555** 0.463** 0.470** 0.472** 0.541** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) 
Low  1.007** 0.999** 1.010** 0.993** 1.078** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) 
No  priority  0.894** 0.840** 0.840** 0.823** 0.867** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) 
Missing  priority  0.640** 0.547** 0.549** 0.517** 0.666** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) 
D[t=1]  0.077** 0.087** 0.088** 0.062** 0.058* 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
High * D[t=1]  0.026  0.031  0.022  0.016  -0.010 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) 
Medium * D[t=1]  0.059*  0.053  0.046  0.051  0.021 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) 
Low  *  D[t=1]  -0.085** -0.077** -0.088** -0.094** -0.120** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) 
No priority * D[t=1]  -0.072**  -0.065*  -0.065*  -0.079**  -0.091** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) 
Missing priority * D[t=1]  0.004  0.010  0.007  -0.002  -0.024 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) 
Adjusted  R2  0.041 0.067 0.068 0.121 0.126 
Observations  245,134 245,134 245,134 245,134 198,313 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001. Dependent variable is ln(waiting time). D[t=1] is an 
indicator for the post-reform period. Model 1 contains only the variables shown. Models 2-5 contain the following 
covariates: male and dummy variables for age category, co-morbidity number and quarter of addition (not shown). 
Model 3 uses exact matching on combinations of male, age category, co-morbidity number and quarter of addition. 
Model 4 is as Model 3 but with hospital fixed effects (not shown). Model 5 additionally matches on combinations with 
the same full ICD10 diagnosis.     27
Table IV Regression results: Scotland 
 
Priority group  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
High 0.204***  0.209***  0.210***  0.142**  0.301** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037) 
Medium 1.061***  0.979***  0.974***  0.853**  0.979** 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024) 
Low 1.946***  1.911***  1.920***  1.694**  2.044** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) 
No priority  1.542***  1.439***  1.440***  1.287**  1.481** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) 
Missing priority  0.833***  0.779***  0.785***  0.717**  0.886** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) 
D[t=1]  0.005 0.005 0.007 0.018 -0.035 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) 
High * D[t=1]  -0.053  -0.063  -0.064  -0.064  0.019 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.047) 
Medium * D[t=1]  -0.043  -0.035  -0.030  -0.047  0.009 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) 
Low * D[t=1]  -0.101***  -0.098***  -0.106***  -0.109**  -0.147** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) 
No priority * D[t=1]  -0.107***  -0.102***  -0.102***  -0.122**  -0.098** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) 
Missing priority * D[t=1]  0.049*  0.049*  0.042  0.020  0.075* 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.027) 
Adjusted  R2  0.111 0.125 0.126 0.183 0.130 
Observations  289,272 289,272 289,272 289,272 241,662 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001. Dependent variable is ln(waiting time). D[t=1] is an 
indicator for the post-reform period. Model 1 contains only the variables shown. Models 2-5 contain the following 
covariates: male and dummy variables for age category, co-morbidity number and quarter of addition (not shown). 
Model 3 uses exact matching on combinations of male, age category, co-morbidity number and quarter of addition. 
Model 4 is as Model 3 but with hospital fixed effects (not shown). Model 5 is the same as Model 3 with additional 
matching on combinations with the same full ICD10 diagnosis.    28
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Appendix: Percentages of patients in each category 
 
   Norway Scotland 
  Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
Priority group (maximum wait)      
Very high (28 days)  9.4  8.91  6.28  5.96 
High  (56  days)  6.41 6.94 2.65 2.66 
Medium (84 days)  16.02  16.13  10.71  10.74 
Low  (182  days)  12.93 13.99 11.85 13.44 
No priority (unlimited)  23.02  21.93  19.7  20.49 
Missing  priority  32.22 32.1 48.81  46.71 
Gender      
Female  52.42 51.71 53.85 54.12 
Male  47.58 48.29 46.15 45.88 
Age categories      
Age 0 – 6  5.6  5.11  4.39  3.97 
Age 7 – 17  5.11  4.81  5.02  4.72 
Age 18 – 39  15.68  14.48  15.63  14.99 
Age 40 – 54  20.64  20.13  20.2  20.82 
Age 55 – 64  18.28  19.52  18.16  19.02 
Age 65 – 74  16.47  17.25  19.75  20.02 
Age 75 – 84  14.8  14.86  13.72  13.41 
Age  85+  3.43 3.83 3.14 3.04 
Number of co-morbidities      
None  46.39 43.4 52.07  51.37 
1  25.7 25.98  21.79 21.8 
2  14.16 14.89 11.52 11.59 
3 7.28  8.07  6.35  6.7 
4  3.41 3.95 3.76 3.96 
5 or more  3.06  3.71  4.5  4.58 
Chapter in ICD10      
Infections (A00-B99)  0.46  0.44  0.3  0.22 
Neoplasms  (C00-D48)  20.77 18.92 16.07 16.04 
Blood  (D50-D89)  0.44 0.51 0.59 0.53 
Endocrine  (E00-E90)  2.19 2.32 1.00 0.95 
Nervous  (G00-G99)  7.08 7.86 2.68 2.91 
Eye (H00-H59)  2.33  1.61  3.4  2.84 
Ear  (H60-H95)  0.83 0.67 1.45 1.35 
Circulatory  (I00-I99)  9.03 9.79 8.92 8.86 
Respiratory  (J00-J99)  5.53 6.21 6.31 6.24 
Digestive (K00-K93)  7.68  7.57  14.61  14.24 
Skin (L00-L99)  1.36  1.2  1.94  1.78 
Musculoskeletal  (M00-M99)  16.55 16.32 14.14 16.18 
Genitourinary (N00-N99)  10.4  10.78  11.63  11.39 
Congenital (Q00-Q99)  2.4  2.04  1.75  1.83 
Symptoms & signs (R00-R99)  3.19  4.02  4.73  4.2 
Injuries & poisoning (S00-T98)  4.23  3.79  2.57  2.69 
Influencing factors (Z00-Z99)  5.54  5.95  7.9  7.75 
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